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MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE ST. JOHNS,
SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER, 1862
PART II
THE FEDERALS CAPTURE ST. JOHNS BLUFF
by EDWIN C. BEARSS
A LL OF BRIGADIER GENERAL John M. Brannan’s Union sol-diers and their arms, horses, and rations had reached shore
by 9 p.m., October 1, 1862. Among the first units to land were
sixty troopers of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry. The horsemen
spent the afternoon and early evening reconnoitering.
General Brannan, on questioning the troopers and several
citizens of pro-Union proclivities, learned that the ground be-
tween the point of debarkation and St. Johns Bluff presented
numerous barriers to the advance of a column of infantry and
artillery. These obstacles were all but impassable swamps and
several unfordable creeks. Realizing that a march up the south
shore of the St. Johns was now out of the question, Brannan
examined two alternative routes on the maps. Either he could
turn his column inland, moving around the head of Pablo Creek,
or he could re-embark his troops and make a second landing
farther up the river “at a strongly guarded position of the enemy.”
The general preferred the second alternative, because the first
called for a forced march of forty miles without artillery and
wagons. 1
Brannan decided on a reconnaissance to see if a feasible land-
ing site could be found above the mouth of Pablo Creek. Com-
mander Charles Steedman made all the small boats of his squad-
ron available to the army, and Lieutenant Commander Edward
P. Williams, executive officer of the Paul Jones, was put in charge
of them.
Brannan then ordered Lieutenant Colonel Tilghman H. Good,
47th Pennsylvania, to embark a battalion aboard the small craft.
Quickly moving his troops to a previously designated point, Good
1. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of
the Union and Confederate Armies,  69 vols. (Washington, 1880-
1901), Series I,  Vol. XIV, 129. (Cited hereafter as O. R.)
[ 331 ]
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reported to Commander Williams. He was delighted to learn that
Williams had two boat howitzers manned by marines from the
Paul Jones and Cimarron.
At a signal from Williams, the launches carrying the sol-
diers pushed off. They pulled into the mouth of Buckhorn Creek
at 2 a.m. Finding the area swampy, Williams moved up the
narrow, winding creek hoping to find a better place to put the
soldiers ashore. Three-quarters of a mile up was Greenfield
Plantation, where there was solid ground. Putting his force
ashore, Williams returned to Mayport Mills and reported to Gen-
eral Brannan. Orders were issued for officers to form their com-
mands. 2
It had rained during the night. Company K, 7th Connecticut,
found shelter in a leaky old warehouse “full of cockroaches, sand
fleas, and several new species of insect life.” According to one of
the soldiers, “the volume of sulphurous language was above par,
but nothing new in manner of expression. This was our first
time of setting foot in Florida. Hard tack and smoky coffee for
grub.” 3
As soon as 2d Battalion, 47th Pennsylvania, could be muster-
ed, fed, and embarked, Williams’ force headed up the St. Johns.
It was about an hour after daylight when these troops reached
Buckhorn Creek. The boats returned to pick up the 7th Con-
necticut. 4
Meanwhile, Brannan had re-embarked the remainder of his
force. Convoyed by warships, the transports had ascended the St.
Johns to the mouth of Pablo Creek. Anchoring, they awaited the
return of Williams’ landing craft. This move would shorten the
distance the sailors had to row the small boats, thus enabling the
Federals to speed up the operation.
* * *
News that a stong force of Federals had landed at Mayport
Mills quickly reached Colonel Charles F. Hopkins, commanding
the Confederate post at St. Johns Bluff, and he promptly for-
2.  Ibid. ,  129,  132;  Official  Records of  the Union and Confederate
Navies in the War of  the Rebell ion,  30 vols. (Washington, 1894-
1922), Series I, Vol. XIII, 363. (Cited hereafter as O. R. N.)
3. Jerome Tourtellotte,  A History of  Company K Seventh Connecticut
Volunteer Infantry in the Civil  War (1910),  46.
4. O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV, 129, 132.
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warded the information to General Joseph Finegan. At the same
time, orders were sent to Captain Joseph L. Dunham, Battery A,
Milton Light Artillery Battalion, to move his entire command
from Yellow Bluff to St. Johns Bluff. The dismounted cavalry
companies which Hopkins had called for earlier arrived during
the night.
Dunham was disturbed by Hopkins’ pre-emptory call for his
field artillery. At the moment the teams and caissons were not
3
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with the guns. Dunham notified Hopkins that because of a short-
age of transportation, it would be hours before his battery would
be ready to move. Hopkins ordered Dunham to send whatever
artillerists he could spare, and he would try to arm them, so they
could fight as infantry. 5
About daybreak, October 2, one of Captain William E.
Chambers’ troopers galloped up to Hopkins’ command post to an-
nounce that the Federals had landed in force at Greenfield. Hop-
kins ordered Major Theodore W. Brevard, 2d Florida Battalion of
Partisan Rangers, to form his infantry and be prepared to move
out.
Posting himself at the observation station atop the bluff,
Hopkins observed the enemy’s movements. He watched Williams’
boats, crowded with troops, leave the transports and disappear up
Buckhorn Creek, and then return an hour or so later. This shut-
tling operation continued throughout the morning.
As soon as he noticed what was happening, Hopkins ordered
Captain Chambers to harass the Federals, and, if possible, check
their advance. Chambers deployed his men as skirmishers near
Parker’s plantation and waited. 6
* * *
Acting under orders from General Brannan, Colonel Good
assembled his regiment, and as soon as two companies had been
deployed as skirmishers, the 47th Pennyslvania started for Park-
er’s plantation. The skirmishers found the going difficult as they
beat their way through dense underbrush and waded swamps.
Some became so exhausted they had to return to the boats. When
his force was about a mile from its destination, Good called a
halt to wait for the 7th Connecticut.
The scouts, Captain Coleman A. G. Keck commanding, push-
ed on until they were within 1,200 yards of Parker’s house. Ap-
prised of this development, Colonel Good joined the skirmish
line. A half dozen Confederates could be seen astride their horses
about a half mile to the front. Climbing a tall tree, the colonel
saw Parker’s house and pinpointed Captain Chambers’ Confeder-
ates.
5.  Ibid. ,  139. Hopkins failed to receive an answer to his 3 a.m. mes-
sage to Dunham.
6 .  I b i d .
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The colonel planned to wait for the 7th Connecticut before
trying to dislodge the Confederates. He paced the ground im-
patiently as time passed. By 10 o’clock, deciding to go ahead
without them, he sent a squad of men to Greenfield to pick up a
six-pounder boat howitzer. This gun had been mounted on a flat-
boat, but because of the difficulty encountered in dragging it
through the swamps, it was noon before the squad returned.
Meanwhile, covered by Keck’s skirmishers, the Pennsylvanians
closed in on Parker’s. Captain Chambers saw that his company
was greatly outnumbered, and after exchanging a few shots, he
ordered the plantation abandoned.
The 7th Connecticut finally arrived, and at 1 p.m. the Union
advance was resumed. Keck’s skirmishers spearheaded the column
as it pushed up the right bank of Mount Pleasant Creek. Except
for an occasional glimpse of a horseman, the Federals saw no
more Confederates until they reached the bridge near the head
of the creek at 2 p.m. The Confederates had damaged the bridge,
but in less than an hour the Federals repaired it.
Crossing the creek, Good moved onto the road leading to
Mount Pleasant Landing. A mile advance brought Keck’s skir-
mishers to a camp. Three men were seen quickly riding off. The
Federals discovered many signs of hurried flight, including a
large table set with “a sumptious meal.” On the center of the
table was a “fine, large meat pie still warm from which one of
the party had already served his plate.” Inspecting the twenty-
three tents, they also found a small quantity of commissary and
quartermaster’s stores. 7
From his command post on St. Johns Bluff, Colonel Hopkins
continued to watch the Federals shuttling men and materiel up
Buckhorn Creek. Captain Chambers kept the colonel informed
of the progress of Good’s column, while Hopkins relayed to Major
Brevard the information garnered from his observations. Cham-
bers’ scouts, spotting the boat howitzers, mistakenly believed the
enemy had landed field artillery, and this news startled Hopkins.
About the time the Federals reached Parker’s plantation,
Brevard was preparing to use his infantry to try to halt the Union
7.  Ibid. ,  129, 132-133,  139-140; Tourtel lot te,  History of  Company K,
4 8 .
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advance. A message from Chambers, however, revealed the Fed-
erals were moving in two columns - one (Good’s) had reached
the west side of Mount Pleasant Creek. Brevard was ordered to
remain where he was.
The next report told of the occupation of Chambers’ camp,
which placed the Federals within a few miles of Brevard’s posi-
tion and in the rear of St. Johns Bluff. Hopkins realized that his
position had been turned.
There were only a few hours of daylight left when Hopkins
ordered Chambers’ troops to retire on Brevard’s battalion. Since
the Federals gave no indication of stopping, Hopkins wished to
concentrate his force so as to protect the rear of the fortifications.
Crews manning six of the ten guns were armed with small-arms,
but many of these weapons were defective. Accompanied by
Captain Stephens’ troopers, a roadblock was established by the
men on the road leading from Mount Pleasant Landing to St.
Johns Bluff.
About dark, Hopkins was notified that the Federals had halt-
ed, and this gave him time to reflect on the situation. In view
of the overwhelming force of the Federals, Hopkins decided he
could not make a successful stand. Counting the armed artiller-
ists, he had a little over 500 men to hold off the enemy column
which had crossed the creek and threatened the batteries from the
rear. It had been raining since the previous night and the men’s
improvised cartridge-boxes were soaked and their ammunition
useless. To make matters more discouraging, reports reaching
Hopkins greatly magnified Brannan’s strength. 8
Hopkins decided not to try to hold St. Johns Bluff. Discus-
sing the situation with Captain John C. Richard and Lieutenant
Thomas O. Stuart, the officers of the batteries, it was agreed that
Major Brevard did not have sufficient force to stop the Federal
offensive. A courier was sent to inform Brevard of the result of
the conference, and to ask for his recommendations. Before the
messenger returned, information reached Hopkins that Brevard
and his officers had already decided their position was untenable.
At 9 p.m. Hopkins ordered St. Johns Bluff abandoned immedi-
8.  O. R.,  Series I, Vol. XIV, 140. Mr. Haynes, a man in whom Hop-
kins had great confidence, said the Federals had no less than 3,000
men. Captain Chambers estimated the strength of the Union force
6
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ately. The Confederates left without even spiking their guns or
blowing up the magazines. 9
General Finegan, who had reached Jacksonville late on the
2nd, was enraged when he heard that the Bluff had been evacu-
ated. He telegraphed Richmond the following day, “As at pres-
ent advised I think we had sufficient force to hold the place, and
that its abandonment by Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkins . . . was a
gross military blunder, that may require investigation.” 10
In the meantime, Colonel Good’s column, after setting fire to
the tents, advanced a mile beyond Chambers’ deserted encamp-
ment and occupied a second bivouac. Although Keck’s skirmish-
ers found no Confederates, they made a good haul of arms, ac-
couterments, and camp equipage. It was dusk before Good’s regi-
ment reached Mount Pleasant Landing. Outposts were establish-
ed and manned, and the men were allowed to take a break. 11
Lieutenant James S. Cannon’s detachment of the 1st Connecticut
Battery with two guns arrived about 9 p.m.
While the Northern infantry had been establishing a beach-
head, Cannon’s men had loaded their guns aboard the Neptune.
The artillerists carried two days’ rations of raw pork, salt junk,
and hardtack. The instructions were to run the vessel up Buck-
horn Creek to a predesignated landing place that would be pointed
out by a Negro. The captain of the Neptune was drunk, how-
ever, and the Negro took over the wheel, but “if the captain was
drunk, the Negro was incapable; for he ran the Neptune into a
mudbank, where it stuck fast.” It was impossible to wait for high
tide, since General Brannan expected the battery to be ashore and
ready to march by daybreak.
which established the beachhead at Greenfield at 2,500. During the
ensuing  four  hours ,  Hopkins  kept  t rack  of  the  movements  of  the
small boat armada. Calculating that these boats were capable of
moving 300 men per hour, he concluded that by the smallest estimate
not less than 1,000 soldiers had landed after Captain Chambers re-
tired from Greenfield. Ibid. ,  140-141.
9.  Ibid. ,  140-141.
10.  Ibid. ,  138.
11. Ibid., 133. Searching the deserted camp, the Federals found eighteen
Hall’s breech-loading carbines, twelve double-barreled shotguns, eight
breech-loading Maynard rifles, eleven Enfield rifles, and ninety-six
knapsacks .  When they  moved of f ,  the  Federa ls  took  these  a rms
with them. Sixteen tents and a small quantity of commissary and
quartermaster’s stores were burned.
7
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A number of small boats were sent to the cannoneers’ rescue,
and about 6 a.m. the artillerists landed in “one of those great
Florida swamps and marshes, among rattlesnakes, copperheads,
centipedes, alligators and many other poisonous reptiles and in-
sects.”  12 The Federals were now ready to continue their advance
on St. Johns Bluff.
Brannan, on the morning of the 3rd, ordered the 47th Penn-
sylvania to hold its ground at Mount Pleasant Landing. He want-
ed to bring up the 7th Connecticut and determine Confederate
strength. After questioning his scouts and local people, Brannan
estimated the Confederates had 1,200 infantry and cavalry, and
nine guns, two of them large columbiads, emplaced on the Bluff.
Calling for reinforcements, he dispatched the master of the trans-
port Cosmopolitan with a message to Colonel Rishworth Rich at
Fernandina. He also ordered the Patroon to sail with the Cosmo-
politan. 13
Shortly before noon, lookouts aboard the gunboats were won-
dering if something were amiss. They had been watching the
bluff for hours and had noted little if any movement; the Con-
federates had not even hoisted their flag. Information reaching
Brannan indicated the enemy might be evacuating and so he and
Steedman ordered a “special reconnaissance.” The E. B. Hale
and the Uncas were sent upriver, with orders to proceed with
caution. 14 The warships first opened fire on the St. Johns Bluff
earthworks, but there was no answer or any sign of life. Then
Lieutenant Snell of the Hale ordered a gig to move into shore.
There the Federals found that the Confederates had fled, leaving
behind guns, ammunition, provisions, and camp equipage. After
raising the American flag, the sailors returned to their ship. 15
When he saw the flag, Steedman ordered the Paul Jones and
the E. B. Hale to move upstream to Jacksonville. The Water
Witch was to land a party to hold the fortifications on the bluff
pending the arrival of the army. 16
12. Ibid.; Herbert W. Beecher, History of the First Light Battery Con-
necticut Volunteers, 1861-1865, 200-201.
13.  O. R.,  Series I,  Vol.  XIV, 128, 130; O. R. N.,  Series I, Vol. XIII,
355, 373.
14. O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV, 130; O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 363.
15.  O. R. N.,  Series I,  Vol. XIII,  357, 363, 370. The guns abandoned
by the  Confedera tes  inc luded  two 8- inch  co lumbiads ,  two 32-
pounder rifles, and four 8-inch siege howitzers.
16.  Ibid. ,  363;  Harper’s Weekly,  October 25, 1862.
8
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When the Paul Jones and the Hale reached Jacksonville at 7
p.m., Steedman learned that he was too late to halt the retreat of
Hopkins’ command. The Confederates had crossed the river sev-
eral hours before. Steedman was also told that the 29th and 30th
Georgia were scheduled to reach Jacksonville the next morning,
October 4. Actually though news of the evacuation had caused
the Georgians to turn back. Hoping that not all the Confederates
had escaped, Steedman had the Hale drop downstream to guard
the Panama Creek ferry while the Paul Jones remained at Jackson-
ville. 17
As soon as he discovered that the Confederates had evacuated
their works, General Brannan ordered his men to push ahead.
Covered by a strong force of skirmishers, the Federals marched
from Mount Pleasant Landing, taking the road paralleling the
St. Johns. 18
“I witnessed a sight which was interesting,” a cannoneer re-
called, “the naval fleet moving up the river and the land forces
commencing their march. After a few shots were sent into the
fort and no reply was made, up went Old Glory amid the huzzas
of the land force and the blowing of whistles of the gunboats and
transports. The enemy had got scared, as our bungling and load-
ing and unloading so many nights had led them to believe that
the whole Union army was coming.” 19
Occasional clashes occurred during the advance between the
Union scouts and roving Confederate patrols. About two miles
from the bluff, the left wing of Colonel Good’s skirmish line
came upon an abandoned encampment. Since it was starting to
get dark, the Federals did not stop. Brannan’s soldiers reached
St. Johns Bluff at 7:30, relieving the sailors from the Water
Witch.
Two companies from the 47th Pennsylvania were sent to ex-
amine the camp, where they found trunks and camp equipage
scattered about. Papers in one tent identified the late occupants
17. O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 363, 370. The 29th and 30th Georgia
which  were  hur r ied ly  pul led  out  of  the  Savannah  defenses  had
reached Lake City by rail. O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV, 616-617.
18. O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV, 130, 133-134.
19. Beecher, History of the 1st Connecticut Battery, 202-203.
9
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of the camp as members of the Milton Artillery. 20 A foraging
party of Confederates, not knowing that the battery had been
abandoned, came in soon after the Federals occupied the bluff
and surrendered. 21
The Federals had been warned not to “venture” into the
swamp between the landing and the bluff. The cook from 1st
Connecticut Battery selected a mess spot “near a large palmetto
jungle” which he thought was safe. “I well remember,” one of
the gunners reported, “just as the fire was burning nicely, out
crawled a huge rattlesnake from the palmetto grove. The heat of
the fire had roused him from his lethargic sleep and the aromatic
fragrance of the coffee was too much for him. Everyone who
saw the reptile had a shot at him with pistols, making him sur-
render very quickly. He measured nine feet in length and had
ten rattles.” 22
Fatigue parties were organized and put to work dismounting
the heavy ordnance and clearing up “a scrub patch on the bluff”
to make camp. 2 3 The soldiers considered their effort wasted,
however, since they spent the night “fighting sand fleas and mos-
quitos.” General Brannan was impressed with the captured posi-
tion. It was his opinion that a small party of determined men
could have maintained this position for considerable time against
even a larger force than was at his disposal. 24
The Cosmopolitan returned from Fernandina with 300 sol-





O.  R . ,  Ser ies  I ,  Vol .  XIV,  130 ,  133-134 .  At  Camp Hopkins  the
Federals also found a small quantity of commissary stores-sugar,
rice, half a barrel of flour, and one bag of salt, which they removed
to St. Johns Bluff on the 4th. Ibid., 134.
Tourtellotte, History of Company K, 48.
Beecher, History of the 1st Connecticut Battery, 201.
O. R.,  Series I, Vol. XIV, 130. Describing the works in his “After
Action Report,” Brannan observed, “I found the late position of the
enemy on St. Johns’ Bluff to be one of great strength, and possessing
a heavy and effective armament, with a good supply of ammunition,
.  .  .  the works being most skillfully and carefully constructed and
the position greatly enhanced by the natural advantages of the ground,
it being approachable from the land by but one route, which would
lead the attacking party through a winding ravine immediately un-
der the guns of the position, and from the narrowness of the chan-
nel at this point and the elevation of the bluff rendering the fighting
of the gunboats most difficult and dangerous.”
24. O. R., Series, I, Vol. XIV, 130; Tourtellotte, History of Company K,
4 9 .  
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ordered them to return to their base. After dropping the soldiers
at Fernandina, the Cosmopolitan was to continue to Hilton Head
with dispatches for General Mitchel and Admiral Du Pont, in-
cluding a request of Commander Steedman for a light-draft coal
vessel and additional ammunition for his big 100-pounder Par-
rotts. 25
On the morning of October 4, small boat parties from the
Paul Jones and the E. B. Hale were ordered to destroy all the
skiffs and flatboats on the reach of the St. Johns between Jack-
sonville and Panama Creek. Such drastic action, Steedman rea-
soned, would keep the Confederates from shifting men and ma-
teriel from one side of the river to the other.
About noon, Steedman took the Paul Jones and returned to
Mayport Mills. The E. B. Hale at the same time was ordered to
make a sweep up the St. Johns to Mandarin Ferry. Steedman
informed General Brannan that he had seen many cornfields on
his run up the river. The general, an exponent of economic
warfare, immediately proposed to carry off or destroy the corn.
Other action against the East Florida Confederates was planned.
It was decided to send a fast moving task force up the St. Johns.
The Cimarron and the Water Witch would proceed to Jackson-
ville, and together with the Hale would ascend the St. Johns as
far beyond Palatka as possible “for the purpose of destroying all
the boats and flats on the river, to prevent the enemy crossing.” 26
Because of a defective steering mechanism, the sailors had
trouble getting the Cimarron up river. Severely buffeted by the
currents, the gunboat anchored five times. According to Com-
mander Woodhull, “we literally made the passage going stern
first.” It was 9 p.m. when the Cimarron and the Water Witch
arrived at Jacksonville, and joined the Hale which had returned
from Mandarin Ferry. 27
25.  O. R.,  Series I,  Vol. XIV, 128; O. R. N.,  Series I, Vol. XIII, 355,
357.  The Cosmopoli tan could tow the coaler on her reutrn to the
St. Johns.
26. O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 363, 370; O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV,
128.
27.  O. R. N.,  Series I,  Vol. XIII,  367, 370. During the day the small
boat parties from the E. B. Hale had destroyed nine boats and one
scow. Ibid. ,  370.
11
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On the morning of October 5, the Water Witch, with Com-
mander Woodhull aboard, and the Hale, started up the St. Johns.
Frequent stops were made during the day and landing parties
were put ashore. A great number of small boats and barges
were destroyed, and at Magnolia Springs, as well as at several
other points, Woodhull had copies of Lincoln’s September 22
Emancipation Proclamation posted. The two gunboats spent the
night anchored off Madison’s Point, about five miles below Orange
Mills.
Thinking it unsafe to take the Water Witch (which drew
11 1/2 feet) over the bar, Woodhull transferred to the E. B. Hale
and proceeded on to Palatka, reaching there at 10 a.m. As the
gunboat approached Palatka only two people were visible, all
others having fled. On anchoring, Woodhull sent a boat ashore
to pick up the two men, one of whom was William D. Moseley,
former governor of Florida, who said that recent Confederate
reverses in Maryland and the capture of St. Johns Bluff had
greatly alarmed the people of East Florida. 28 Woodhull, having
seen only three white men since leaving Jacksonville, wondered
where they all were. 29 Moseley told him that they “had all fled
to the bush, as a report had been circulated by the flying troops
from Fort St. John that it was the purpose of . . . [the] ‘vandals’
to seize every white man and either execute him at once or send
him to a Northern prison.”
Woodhull also learned that about fifty Confederate cavalry-
men from St. Johns Bluff and twelve mules had crossed the
river at Palatka after abandoning their wagons at Deep Creek. He
urged Moseley, when he returned to shore, to ask the people “to
return to the town, and . . . to inform them that . . . they had
been deceived by their own people; that it was not . . . [the Fed-
erals’] purpose to molest unarmed men and that the future ex-
istence of their town would depend on their own peaceful
conduct.” 30
28.  Ibid. ,  367-368, 370. On September 16 and 17, General Robert E.
Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia fought the Battle of Antietam. Al-
though Lee escaped defeat, his losses were so great that he was com-
pelled to abandon his position and retire across the Potomac into
Virginia.
29.  Ibid. ,  368. Besides Moseley and his companion, a white man was
seen at Magnolia.
3 0 .  I b i d .
12
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The man with Governor Moseley identified himself as Mr.
Blood, a Northerner. When he expressed fear of “being seized
and made to ornament a pine tree for his well-known Union
views and attachment to the United States Government,” Wood-
hull ordered an armed party to bring Blood’s family and property
aboard the gunboat.
The party had been gone about fifteen minutes when Wood-
hull saw about forty or fifty armed horsemen riding toward the
area where Blood’s house was located. He immediately ordered
the boats recalled and the anchor weighed. “General Quarters”
sounded, and the ship’s guns began firing over the town, toward
the oncoming horsemen. At first, the Confederates pressed on,
hoping to reach the cover afforded by nearby houses, but they
were not successful. After three or four men had been unhorsed,
the rest gave up and retired into the bush. The landing party
returned and succeeded in moving Blood’s family to the gunboat.
About thirty Negroes who had helped pilot the Union ship up the
St. Johns were also brought off, together with their families. 31
Meanwhile, a deputation of women assembled on the wharf,
and one of them, Mrs. Boyd, informed Commander Woodhull
that “the men had fled to the swamps; that a part of the disor-
ganized cavalry were in the neighborhood; that they were un-
controllable, and she begged . . . [Woodhull], as they were un-
able to help themselves or prevent violence of the men, not to
shell the town.”
Woodhull did not agree that the women had no influence
with the men, “It was a well-known fact that this war had been
mainly kept alive by the violence and the influence of the women
brought to bear on their fathers, husbands, and sons.” He did
promise, however, that “if the force back of the town was imme-
diately removed, and the quiet citizens left undisturbed . . . [he]
would not then shell the town.” Otherwise, his men would open
fire in two hours.
Mrs. Boyd had anticipated Woodhull, and had already sent
a message to the commander of the partisans, asking him to
evacuate the locality. Shortly afterwards the partisans moved out,
Mrs. Boyd informed Woodhull, who pretended to believe it was
31. Ibid. 
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her “influence that had sent those gentlemen to the right about,
but at the same time did not change . . . [his] belief in the com-
pelling power of our shells.” 32  That afternoon the two gun-
boats returned to Orange Mills, where Woodhull and the Blood
family transferred to the Water Witch, and the following morn-
ing they sailed to Jacksonville. The E. B. Hale returned to
Palatka. 33
* * *
In the meantime, General Brannan and his staff aboard the
Paul Jones and two infantry battalions on the Ben De Ford
moved up the St. Johns on the morning of October 5. 34 It was
about 2 p.m. when the vessels reached Jacksonville. As soon as
the soldiers landed, Brannan, leaving a reserve at the dock,
moved his troops into town.
As the troops were pressing forward toward the outskirts,
suddenly there was a rattle of musketry. The captain of the re-
serve force left at dockside hurriedly ordered his men into for-
mation, and about that time Brannan and his “gold-laced Staff”
came pounding down the street, “their coat-tails elevated and
extremely careless of following precedence in rank.”
The reserves, Company K, 7th Connecticut, moved off on
the double toward the scene of the firing. Turning up the rail-
road track, the Federals joined their comrades, who were deployed
in line of battle. The clash was with a small mounted Confed-
erate detachment that was encamped just outside Jacksonville.
As soon as Company K arrived, the column pressed on, pushing
up the main street. In the face of this advance, the Confeder-
ates pulled back. When a naval lieutenant arrived with a boat
howitzer and some sailors, the reinforced Federals marched on to
a road junction about a mile outside town, where they estab-
lished a perimeter covering the approaches to the city. 35
32.  Ibid. ,  369.
33.  Ibid. ,  370. Following his return to Jacksonville, Commander Wood-
hull made out his report and handed it to Commander Steedman. He
repor ted  he  found the  corn  crop  average ,  and in  h is  opin ion  i t
should suffice to take care of the Floridians’ normal consumption.
Woodhul l  was  a l so  an  ear ly  advoca te  of  economic  warfa re .  He
thought the greatest blow which the Federals could administer to the
Southern economy would be to destroy the sugar crop and the small
salt works along the coast and rivers of eastern Florida. Ibid., 369.
34.  Ibid. ,  363;  O. R.,  Series I,  Vol. XIV, 130-131.
35. Tourtellotte, History of Company K, 49-50.
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On the morning of October 6 a transport with additional
companies of the 7th Connecticut came up river. To keep the
men off the streets, the provost marshal ordered them to remain
aboard ship. This was unwelcomed news, because the men of
Companies A and K reported that the town was a pleasant place
with many pretty girls. 36
The provost guards fell down on their responsibility. There
was plundering of private property, with the sailors the worst
offenders: “Their wide-collared, capacious sailor shirts were
crammed with plunder, their leather belts preventing any slip-
ping down below the waist line.” 37
* * *
An “intelligent contraband,” formerly a pilot aboard the Con-
federate steamer Governor Milton, asked (on the morning of Oc-
tober 6) to see Commander Steedman and General Brannan. He
informed them that an expedition sent up the St. Johns could
capture the Governor Milton and other vessels which the Con-
federates had hidden.
Commander Williams was ordered to place two 24-pounder
howitzers from the Paul Jones on the steamer Darlington. As
soon as Acting Master Charles G. Loring and twenty-four sailors
from the flagship and Captain Charles H. Yard and 100 sailors
from the 47th Pennsylvania came aboard, the Darlington started
up the St. Johns. 38 Passing the Water Witch north of Orange
Mills, she reached Palatka where she rendezvoused with the E. B.
Hale. Before resuming her run up the river at 8 a.m., October
7, a fatigue party from the Darlington was put ashore to gather
wood. Afterwards the two gunboats left Palatka, and at noon
they tied up at Welaka.
The water at the entrance to Lake George was too shallow
for the Hale to pass, so Williams ordered Lieutenant Snell to
remain behind with his gunboat and blockade the mouth of
Ocklawaha River. The Darlington moved on through Lake
George to Volusia where a landing party went ashore to question
the inhabitants. A ferryman, brought aboard the Darlington, re-
36.  Ibid. ,  52.
3 7 .  I b i d .
38.  O. R.,  Series I,  Vol. XIV, 131; O. R. N.,  Series I, Vol. XIII, 364,
3 6 6 .    
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ported that several steamers had recently passed Volusia, and
Williams ordered the chase continued.
At Hawkinsville, where the Darlington arrived after dark,
Williams put a detachment ashore. Although they searched the
houses, the Federals were unable to find any inhabitants. Unmis-
takeable signs, fires and turned down beds, indicative of a hur-
ried departure, were plentiful. Letters were found which led
Williams to believe that the Governor Milton was hidden in a
nearby creek. Fearing that the townspeople might have sent a
party to burn the vessel, Williams ran the Darlington up the
creek as far as the pilot could take her. The ship’s small boat
carrying sixteen men and two officers was lowered. Towing a
small canoe with six soldiers, the boat started up the creek. With-
in a half mile, the Federals caught sight of the Governor Milton
moored to the bank. She was boarded without incident, and the
engineers guarding her meekly surrendered. The fires were stoked
and within fifteen minutes of her capture Williams had the prize
underway. They returned to the St. Johns, but Williams saw
that the Governor Milton could not keep up. He ordered it an-
chored in mid-channel to await the Darlington’s return.
People at Lake Beresford reported a steamer had passed the
previous afternoon. Reasoning that the vessel had already reached
Enterprise, Williams thought it would take his men a day or two
to find her. Rations were running short, and the commander
was afraid the Southerners might block the river behind him by
felling trees in the channel. Consequently, he decided not to
press on. 39
Early on the 8th the Darlington, followed by her prize,
started down the St. Johns. Stopping at Hawkinsville and Volu-
sia, landing parties were put ashore to appropriate supplies and
destroy property. The E. B. Hale was encountered at Welaka,
and Mr. Allen and his effects were transferred from that vessel
to the Darlington. Escorted by the Hale, Williams’ expedition
continued down river, and tied up at Jacksonville at daybreak,
October 9. 40  Commander Steedman was delighted to see the
Governor Milton, and he asked General Brannan to leave it be-
39. O. R. N., Series I, Vol. XIII, 366-367.
40.  Ibid. ,  367. Allen had collaborated with the Federals and wanted to
leave the area to escape the vengeance of his neighbors.
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hind when the army returned to Port Royal. He planned to arm
the prize and use her to search out Confederate salt works. 41
* * *
The Cosmopolitan, which had been sent to Port Royal for
supplies, returned to the St. Johns on October 7. In crossing the
bar, she grounded, knocking a hole in her bottom. Repairs
would have to be made before the vessel could go to sea again.
With the Cosmopolitan out of action, Brannan, seeing that
the army’s work on the St. Johns was completed, decided to
shuttle his command back to its base. Orders were issued for
Colonel Joseph R. Hawley, 7th Connecticut, to embark his regi-
ment aboard the steamer Boston.
Before the regiment left Jacksonville, Quartermaster Sergeant
Edgar M. Woodford died of malaria and was buried in the yard
of the Episcopal Church on the outskirts of town. Since there
was some fear that Woodford might have also had yellow fever,
Brannan ordered the embarkation expedited. He also wanted
the Boston to be returned as soon as possible to assist in trans-
porting the remainder of the brigade to Beaufort. 42
The Boston crossed the bar early on the 8th. The sea was
rough and many of the soldiers became seasick. There were a
number of contrabands on board, including “some very pretty
quadroon girls who had been house servants in Jacksonville.” The
Boston reached Port Royal at 11 p.m., but the health officers,
because of the yellow fever scare, would not let the steamer tie up
at the pier until 10 o’clock the next morning. 43
Upon the return of the Darlington on the 9th, Brannan
pulled the rest of his soldiers out of Jacksonville, utilizing the
Ben De Ford and Darlington to transport the troops to St. Johns
Bluff. At the bluff, Colonel Good and his fatigue parties placed
all the captured heavy ordnance aboard the Neptune, demolished
the earthworks, and prepared the magazines to be blown up. On
October 11, Brannan sent Cannon’s section of the 1st Connecti-
cut Battery and one company of the 47th Pennsylvania aboard
the Darlington and the vessel sailed for Hilton Head by way of
41.  Ibid. ,  358-359;  O. R.,  Series I, Vol. XIV, 131.
42.  O. R.,  Series I ,  Vol.  XIV, 131, 386-387; Tourtellotte,  History of
Company K,  52.
43. Tourtellotte, History of Company K, 53.
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Fernandina. After exploding the magazines, Brannan loaded the
remainder of his troops, except one company of the 47th Penn-
sylvania, on the Ben De Ford and the Boston. The detached
company remained behind to guard the damaged Cosmopolitan.
On the 13th, the crowded transports steamed past Hilton Head. 44
*  *  *
When the army left Jacksonville, Steedman divided his squad-
ron. Commander Woodhull with the Cimarron, Water Witch,
and E. B. Hale remained at Jacksonville, while the remaining
vessels patrolled the river between Jacksonville and Mayport.
Early on the 10th, the Hale was sent on another sweep up
the St. Johns. The little gunboat stopped at Forresters Point
where she destroyed two scows and several small boats, and at
Orange Mills she burned a large mill owned by Dr. Mays. When
she returned to Jacksonville the Hale carried thirty-nine contra-
bands and towed two large scows and several smaller craft. 45
The Uncas was anchored off Yellow Bluff on the evening of
the 10th, when the watch reported lights on shore. Studying the
lights, Acting Master Crane was convinced the Confederates were
“doing something to cause an interruption of the river.” As soon
as it was light, Crane reported what he had observed to Com-
mander Woodhull, who wondered if the Confederates planned to
reoccupy Yellow Bluff and mount guns in the emplacements
there. His landing parties had secured information recently
which reinforced his fears. According to reports, a Confederate
force was operating on the St. Augustine road and General Fine-
gan still had enough guns to emplace an impregnable battery.
Moreover, the Cimarron was running short of coal, and pro-
visions and ammunition were getting low. Thus lightened, she
was almost unmanageable. Should big guns be mounted on Yel-
low Bluff, Woodhull believed his position would be precarious.
He accordingly dispatched a message to Commander Steed-
man, urging that forces be put ashore at Yellow Bluff to level
earthworks, burn houses, and fell the nearby timber. This dis-
patch was carried by Commander Pendergrast of the Water
Witch, who was to scrutinize the shore as he passed the bluff. If
he saw anything suspicious, he would have his gunners fire. 46
44. O. R., Series I, Vol. XIV, 131.
45.  O. R. N.,  Series I,  Vol.  XIII,  361, 364, 370.
46. Ibid., 360-361.  
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Meanwhile, the Uncas returned to her station off Yellow
Bluff. Not seeing anything out of the ordinary, Pendergrast held
his fire as the Water Witch dropped down the St. Johns. Steed-
man, on learning the Cimarron was short of coal, ordered the
Uncas to carry fuel to Woodhull. He wanted to use the Patroon,
but her crew had become “so demoralized and insubordinate as
to render her totally inefficient,” and she was returned to Port
Royal. 47
Believing that the Confederate threat on the St. Johns had
been nullified, Captain Sylvanus W. Godon, temporary comman-
der of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, decided to cut
his commitments in the area. There were several reasons for
this decision. First, with the capture and destruction of fortifi-
cations on the St. Johns, it would be possible for vessels assigned
to blockade the river to operate inside the bar. Sweeps could be
made up the St. Johns at frequent intervals to harass planters
and keep the Confederates from mounting additional guns on
the bluffs. Second, warships would be required to support an
action in South Carolina which was planned for the near future.
On October 16, Commander Steedman was ordered to re-
turn to Port Royal with his flagship and the Uncas and Water
Witch. Woodhull would remain with the Cimarron, the E. B.
Hale, and the Governor Milton to enforce the blockade. The next
morning Steedman crossed the bar and started on his run up
the coast. 48
The days immediately following the departure of Steedman
were not uneventful. The Cimarron took position off Mayport
Mills, while the E. B. Hale and the Governor Milton patrolled
the river to a point above Yellow Bluff. On October 20, fifty
marines from the Cimarron came aboard the Governor Milton
4 7 .  Ib id . ,  359-360 ,  380 .  On  do ing  so ,  S teedman  sen t  a long  a  no te
stating that he did not believe Acting Master Urann was “to blame
for the disreputable condition of affairs on board of his vessel.”
Charges and specifications prepared by Urann against four mem-
bers of the Patroon’s crew (Walter Harrington, William Williams,
William McIntyre, and James Waltzingford) were also forwarded
to the admiral.
48.  Ibid. ,  393.  The Uncas carried a number of contrabands who were
to be put ashore at Fernandina. As soon as the Negroes were landed,
the Uncas was to “proceed with all dispatch to Port Royal.” The hole
in the Cosmopolitan’s hull having been repaired, she also sailed at
this time.
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and they proceeded up Sisters Creek to Cedar Point. There the
marines discovered and destroyed a large salt works. By night-
fall, the vessel was back on the St. Johns. Satisfied with destruc-
tion of the salt manufactory, Woodhull wanted reinforcements
so as to expand his operations and patrol the river as far as Lake
Beresford. 49
The gunboat Seneca arrived off the bar on October 21 with
dispatches for Woodhull, denying his requests for additional ves-
sels. In fact, his command was being reduced. The Governor
Milton was to proceed immediately to Port Royal for appraisal
by a prize court. 50
Naturally, Woodhull was disappointed. Several times during
the past week mounted partisans had been sighted, although the
Confederates had kept well beyond the range of the Cimarron’s
guns. If he were allowed to keep the Governor Milton, Wood-
hull wrote Captain Godon that he wanted to send her up the
small tributary streams to check on the strength of these patrols
and destroy them if possible. 51 This dispatch was given to the
master of the Neptune. But because of other commitments the
navy was unable to listen to Commander Woodhull’s plea.
49. Ibid., 398.   
5 0 .  Ib id . ,  406 .  The  24-pounders  were  t rans fe r red  to  the  C i m a r r o n ,
while fuel and provisions to last for a week were placed aboard the
Governor Mil ton.  For protection on her run up the coast, the crew
of the prize steamer would rely on one of the Cimarron’s 12-pounder
boat howitzers.
51. Ibid., 406-407. The Neptune had reached the St. Johns on the 21st.
Woodhull turned out working parties to load the steamer with lum-
ber and a number of other “valuable articles” which had fallen into
the Federals’ hands at Mayport Mills.
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